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After Fides et Ratio: New Models for 
a New Millennium 
 
Philip Rossi 




We are a few days short of the second anniversary of the 
publication of Fides et Ratio, Pope John Paul II’s encyclical on the 
relationship between faith and reason (September 14, 1998). We are 
also a bit more than a month beyond the one hundred and twenty first 
anniversary of the publication of Aeterni Patris, Pope Leo XIII’s 
encyclical mandating instruction in the Christian philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas in the seminary education of Catholic priests (August 
4, 1879). The historical significance of that earlier document is quite 
clear: The Neo-Thomist intellectual movement that Pope Leo’s 
encyclical of a century ago endorsed played a major role in the 
shaping of Catholic theology at least up to Vatican Council II (cf. FR 
57). Even today, when neo-Thomism no longer [holds] the dominant 
position it held in Catholic thought after the publication of Aeterni 
Patris (McCool, The Neo-Thomists 157), a knowledge of the course of 
19th and 20th century Neo-Thomism remains an important resource for 
understanding the directions Catholic theology has taken subsequent 
to the close of the Council in 1965.  
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It is, of course, far too early to make any firm judgment about 
the eventual historical impact of John Paul II’s encyclical. There are, 
nonetheless, some intriguing correlations between these two 
documents that suggest what might come to pass as a result of this 
effort to articulate the relationship between faith and reason in the 
context of our contemporary globalized culture. Whereas Leo XIII’s 
encyclical was one of the first of his pontificate, Pope John Paul II’s 
seems likely to be one of the last of his pontificate. Both documents 
reflect, though in notably different ways, the accomplishments of the 
Church Councils that preceded them. The scope of Aeterni Patris was 
relatively circumscribed in terms of the specific reforms it proposed. It 
sought to put the understanding of faith and reason articulated in Dei 
Filius (Vatican I’s Apostolic Constitution on Faith) into the content and 
practice of seminary education by prescribing the neo-Thomist ideal of 
scholastic philosophy as the necessary means to equip the Church’s 
ministers for their apostolate in the modern world (McCool, Catholic 
Theology in the Nineteenth Century 228). The scope of Fides et Ratio, 
by contrast, is far more wide ranging. It is less concerned with 
proposing specific reforms in educational practice as it is with 
identifying and assessing a number of key intellectual and cultural 
currents at work in the contemporary world. In so doing, it offers a 
particular instance of the crucial task articulated for the Church in 
Gaudium et Spes (Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church and 
the Modern World), i. e., the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times 
and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel (GS 4).  
I would like us to dwell a bit on that phrase scrutinizing the 
signs of the times in relation to both of these documents. Even though 
Aeterni Patris appeared many decades before Vatican Council II 
highlighted this phrase, both it and Fides et Ratio are efforts to read 
and respond to the signs of their particular times in history. I hope 
that by looking (briefly) at how these two documents each approach 
the intellectual and cultural situation facing Catholic philosophical and 
theological thinking in their respective eras will enable us to locate 
better the challenges such thinking is likely to face in the era after 
Fides et Ratio i.e., in the opening decades of the twenty-first century 
that now lie before us. Since the era ahead of us seems likely to be 
one in which cultural and intellectual change continue to accelerate 
even beyond today’s often dizzying pace, I think it important to make 
some effort to extend the horizon against which we read Fides et Ratio 
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into that uncertain future. To do so, moreover, may involve venturing 
further into some intellectual and cultural territory that Fides et Ratio 
only points out, but does not itself move forward to explore.  
The main point that will emerge from such a discussion is that 
Fides et Ratio may very well mark both the conclusion of one chapter 
in the Church’s intellectual history and the beginning of a new chapter 
that is starting to take shape in this century. Simply put, the chapter 
coming to a close is one in which the Catholic Church encouraged the 
investment of a great deal of intellectual capital in efforts to construct 
a single conceptual system for the work of philosophers and 
theologians. Such a system, it was hoped, would articulate the 
underlying unity of our created and redeemed human reality and 
would clearly show how faith and reason can be, at once, distinct from 
one another yet function harmoniously in concert with one another. 
The great nineteenth century Neo-Thomists envisioned such a unified 
conceptual system to be the appropriate vessel in which to navigate 
safely against the treacherous currents of subjectivism, historicism, 
rationalism, empiricism and relativism that Enlightenment and post-
Enlightenment philosophy had loosed upon modern culture.  
What marks Fides et Ratio as the start of a new and potentially 
exciting chapter in the intellectual history of Catholicism is its 
recognition (sometimes hesitatingly phrased) that no one conceptual 
system by itself may have both the suppleness and sharpness needed 
to articulate fully the richness of the divine and the human realities 
that interlock the activities of faith and reason in our human lives. 
Even as it hails the enduring originality of the thought of St. Thomas 
Aquinas and notes that the Church has been justified in consistently 
proposing Saint Thomas as a master of thought and a model of the 
right way to do theology (FR 43), it does not repeat the endorsement 
that Aeterni Patris gives to Aquinas= thought and method as the sole 
secure philosophical path to truth (AP 24). Instead, Fides et Ratio 
clearly states that The Church has no philosophy of its own nor does 
she canonize any one particular philosophy in preference to others (FR 
49). It concretely acknowledges a legitimate range of philosophical 
pluralism in the recognition it accords to the genuine accomplishments 
of a number of movements, such as phenomenology, (FR 59) and 
individual thinkers, such as Newman, Edith Stein, and Soloviev (FR 
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74), whose work stands outside the traditions of Neo-Thomism and 
scholasticism.  
In suggesting that Fides et Ratio may mark the start of a new 
chapter in the intellectual history of Catholic thinking, I think it 
important to make it clear that this may not be an explicit or central 
aim that John Paul II himself had in composing this text. In fact, a 
careful reading of the text suggests that of more central concern is an 
effort to provide a set of links through which current discussions in 
philosophy may draw upon the resources of the long heritage of 
philosophical thinking that has been done in the context of Christian 
faith. A key element in this concern is the sober assessment John Paul 
II makes of the state of contemporary philosophy. This assessment 
quite correctly identifies what Lonergan would term a scotoma a blind 
spot, in much of the academic philosophical work produced in the 
twentieth century that has often made it difficult for faith to engage 
philosophy in a mutually constructive dialogue. John Paul II who does 
not himself use the image of blind spot describes this gap in 
contemporary philosophical thinking when he calls upon philosophy to 
recover its sapiential dimension as a search for the ultimate and 
overarching meaning of life (FR 81). It is only by attending to this 
dimension, he argues, that philosophy will be able to acknowledge that 
the human quest for meaning is ordered toward the transcendent 
reality that is, at once, the God of the philosophers and the God of 
Abraham and Sarah and of Mary and Jesus.  
This blind spot arises, at least in part, from the changed role 
that philosophy has taken in modern culture. Whereas philosophy once 
functioned as an integrating form of thinking that had as its main 
concern the articulation of an inclusive meaning for human existence, 
it has been gradually reduced to one of the many fields of human 
knowing; indeed in some ways it has been consigned to a wholly 
marginal role (FR 47). This shift in the role of philosophy is itself 
indicative of a shift in the larger culture’s understanding of reason. For 
contemporary culture reason’s primary function is not one of 
discerning a larger meaning for human life. Reason’s function and 
main value lies in being an instrument for the acquisition of power, 
wealth, or whatever end may fall within the ambit of the human 
capacity for choice. One ironic consequence of the instrumentalization 
of the value of reason is that reason itself becomes suspect, even for 
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the very discipline, philosophy, for which it is the central form of 
inquiry. As John Paul II notes there is the distrust of reason found in 
much contemporary philosophy, which largely has abandoned 
metaphysical study of the ultimate human questions in order to 
concentrate upon problems which are much more detailed and 
restricted, at times, even purely formal (FR 61).  
In noting that reason has itself become suspect in contemporary 
culture, Fides et Ratio points to a larger difference between its analysis 
of the context it seeks to address and the analysis that Leo XIII 
proposed for his contemporary context. Whereas Aeterni Patris 
attributed the bitter strife of these days...and the troubles that vex 
public and private life to the false conclusions concerning divine and 
human things, which originated in the schools of philosophy [that] 
have now crept into all the orders of the State (AP 2), Fides et Ratio is 
a bit more hesitant in tracing the ills it sees afflicting the contemporary 
world directly back to the errors of philosophers. The connection that it 
draws between flawed philosophical views and cultural practices that 
threaten the dignity of human persons is more complex than the one 
operative in Aeterni Patris, for which the root of evil practice lies in the 
error of the intellect: For since it is in the very nature of man to follow 
the guide of reason in his actions, if his intellect sins at all his will soon 
follows; and thus it happens that false opinions, whose seat is in the 
understanding, influence human actions and pervert them (AP 2; cf 
the recent declaration from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, Dominus Jesus, #4 that seems to echo the sentiments of Aeterni 
Patris).  
For John Paul II, who makes the mutual relation of truth and 
freedom a linchpin of his understanding of our human capacities for 
understanding and action, the matter is not as simple. The human 
search for truth is so deeply entwined with the exercise of freedom, 
particularly in entering into interpersonal relationships of mutual trust 
that a flawed exercise of freedom affects our capacity to acknowledge 
truth just as much as intellectual error misleads the will (see, for 
instance FR 33). More is needed to correct a humanly destructive 
practice than simply an acknowledgment of the intellectual error that 
may be embedded in it. One consequence of this difference in 
perspectives is that the tone of Fides et Ratio is less combative than 
Aeterni Patris in its treatment of philosophical positions it sees as 
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problematic with respect to Christian faith. John Paul II certainly offers 
penetrating criticism of some of the same prevailing errors (AP 31) 
that Leo XIII hoped a renewed system of instruction in Thomism would 
refute yet the current pontiff’s manner of engagement with the 
philosophical views that manifest such errors is more dialogical than 
polemical stance taken by his predecessor. 
 
This difference in perspectives, moreover, has a consequence of 
far greater importance that the shift in tone that I have just noted. 
John Paul II’s insight into the mutual relationship between truth and 
freedom enables Fides et Ratio to point the dialogue between faith and 
reason in the direction of the as yet unchartered intellectual and social 
territory that seems to be emerging from the dynamics of the so-called 
globalized culture of the twenty-first century. This territory into which 
the text of Fides et Ratio does not itself venture very far is being 
demarcated by practices within that culture which, in my judgment, 
have the potential of radically altering not necessarily for the better 
our very understanding of what it is to be human. A crucial reason, 
moreover, why the dialogue between faith and reason must enter this 
territory is the fact that these dynamics challenge what may very well 
be the most fundamental premise of Fides et Ratio namely, that a 
quest for ultimate and final meaning is basic to the dynamics of human 
life.  
Fides et Ratio is by no means novel or unique in locating both 
faith and reason as aspects of a deeply rooted human need to have 
one’s own life and the context(s) of one’s life make sense in a 
definitive way. As John Paul II expresses it: No one can avoid this 
questioning [i.e., of whether life has a meaning?]....Whether we admit 
it or not, there comes for everyone the moment when personal 
existence must be anchored to a truth recognized as final, a truth 
which confers certitude no longer open to doubt (FR 27). Yet what if it 
were possible for persons to live in ways that are at least apparently 
humanly satisfying, but without a framework of definitive meaning? 
Suppose that the human quest for meaning could be satisfied by a 
series of discrete, partial episodes of making sense that need not add 
up to a final, comprehensive framework, or suppose, even more 
radically, that one, or one’s culture, came to accept that the quest for 
final meaning need not be satisfied at all. Suppose most people 
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considered it not at all problematic to hold that life mostly consists, to 
use a colloquial expression, of one damn thing after another and that 
few, if any, felt that there was any urgency to make of it anything 
more than that.  
Such a set of dynamics for living without a framework for final 
meaning is, I believe, already operative at a number of levels 
(theoretical, practical, popular) in the emerging cultures of 
informational, economic and technological globalization. If this is so, 
then these are the dynamics upon which the dialogue between faith 
and reason will need to focus in a careful and thorough way 
 after Fides et Ratio. These dynamics are significantly unlike those 
that have been present in the intellectual and culture currents with 
which both Aeterni Patris and Fides et Ratio contend. Those earlier 
currents were typically modern forms of subjectivism, atheism, 
historicism, rationalism, empiricism and relativism, which Aeterni 
Patris terms the false conclusions concerning divine and human things, 
which originated with the schools of philosophy (AP 2), as well as the 
nihilism that Fides et Ratio sees following in their wake (FR 90-91). For 
most of the chapter of intellectual and cultural history that Fides et 
Ratio may be helping to close, i.e, the chapter that many title 
modernity, these false conclusions of modernity did not normally 
contest one crucial piece of common ground they have shared with 
most philosophical and theological articulations of Christian faith. They 
all presumed the validity or the significance of a human quest for final 
meaning, As a result, their quarrels with Christian faith have not 
typically been about whether human beings seek a final meaning but 
rather about what, if anything, will indeed satisfy that quest.  
In contrast, some of the dynamics present in emergent forms of 
(so-called) post-modern global culture work from a quite different 
presupposition about the human quest for final meaning and the 
possibility of its satisfaction. This radically different presupposition is: 
Meaning is not and can never be final, it is only and always a matter of 
immediacy, contingency and surface. The connections that constitute 
meaning are merely transient links that one just as easily clicks on as 
clicks off. Since every meaning is evanescent, any meaning will do. As 
a result, one need not regret abandoning one form of meaning for 
another, or for yet another  after  that. Meanings have only limited, 
contingent usefulness and, like everything else in a global 
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marketplace, are disposable once their usefulness for the moment has 
run its course. These dynamics offer precisely the possibility of setting 
aside, without (much) regret, that which Fides et Ratio sees as a basic 
to our humanity: a quest for a life-meaning that is unifying and 
comprehensive. In place of this restless quest for final meaning we can 
now substitute the transient satisfactions that consist in whatever 
meaning can be constructed in and from the interrupted and 
interrupting interplay of life’s particularity and contingency.  
This presupposition, and the practical consequences that flow 
from it, is not altogether novel. The 18th century Scottish philosopher 
David Hume eloquently proposed a similar view: An effective cure for 
the temptation to embark on a quest for final meaning is to find some 
pleasant diversion that does not purport to exhibit itself as something 
deeper. (In Hume’s case, these diversions at least had the virtue of 
being social, such as a game of billiards or a glass of good sherry 
shared with friends; in our case, often enough, it is the privacy of the 
video screen and the remote.) Such clear-headed recognition of the 
absence of final meaning need not lead, as it did for the existentialists 
of the middle third of the last century, to defiance or despair in the 
face of a cosmos ultimately indifferent to the fate of any of its 
particular components. In today’s context, this recognition simply 
allows one to get on with making one’s way through the partialities 
and contingencies of one’s own life with an equanimity that comes 
from putting aside as pointless any quest for a deeper or final meaning 
in it.  
John Paul II certainly recognizes the presence of a crisis of 
meaning in contemporary culture (FR 81) and takes note of the 
postmodernist claim that the human being must now learn to live in a 
horizon of total absence of meaning, where everything is provisional 
and ephemeral (F & R 91). In spite of this recognition, the text of Fides 
et Ratio does not seem to me to be incisive enough its treatment of 
this challenge. To return to an image that I used earlier in this talk, 
though it points this territory out to us, it does not venture very far in 
exploring it. Moreover, because it only briefly draws our attention to it, 
it makes us susceptible to underestimating both the nature and the 
depth of the challenge that it poses.  
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The passing glance that Fides et Ratio casts upon the absence of 
meaning could lead us to think that this is just one more intellectual 
challenge on a par with empiricism, eclecticism, pragmatism, or any of 
the other isms singled out for analysis and critique in the encyclical. 
This, I believe, would be a serious mistake. The challenge posed to 
both faith and reason here is not simply that of another false 
conclusion. It is, instead, the challenge that is offered by a way of 
living, something that can get so seamlessly woven into the fabric of 
daily practice that the absence of final meaning in our human makeup 
becomes unsurprising. It is taken as a matter of course that human 
life is solely a matter of contingent particularity that need not add up, 
individually or collectively, to all that much in the end, so long as it 
adds up for now. The challenge that this way of living at ease in the 
absence of final meaning presents is quite different from that of 
previous modern challenges to religious belief and practice. These 
more typically took form as an articulated theoretical denial or 
indignant protest (be it social or personal) in the face of claims made 
on behalf of transcendence. This post-modern challenge is far more 
likely to be, in practice, an expression of puzzlement or a shrug of 
indifference before the kind of claim Fides et Ratio makes that [all] 
people seek an absolute which might give to all their searching a 
meaning and an answer, something ultimate that might serve as the 
ground of all things (F & R 27). This shrug is directed not so much at 
the content of any claim about ultimate meaning, but at the very 
possibility that such ultimate meaning, or its denial, is a matter of 
importance in the business of negotiating one’s way through life. As 
the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has succinctly put it: The 
threat at the margin of modern non-theistic humanism is: So what? 
(Sources of the Self, 317). The shrug of indifference, moreover, is no 
longer, as it might have been in the heyday of theoretical atheism, 
simply about what may be claimed about God; it is about what we 
may claim about our own humanity.  
One way I have found helpful to describe this challenge is to 
think of it as a leveling of meaning: since all meaning is the same, any 
meaning will do. As much as we might joke about channel surfing or 
Web surfing, the click that changes the screen may be indicative of a 
quite powerful phenomenon at play in our contemporary culture. We 
quite literally have put in our hands the capacity to click on or click off 
any range of meaning that presents itself to us. Similarly, the ease 
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with which we now can connect with each other as fellow human 
beings is paralleled by the ease with which we may also disconnect 
from one another: The thirty second glimpse at the HIV ravaged face 
of sub-Saharan Africa on the evening news is followed by aggressive, 
sexually evocative images promoting the latest model luxury SUV. The 
human skills and technologies that have made it possible for us 
instantaneously and globally to extend our contacts with one another 
can be exhilarating, but they also have a side that is deeply 
disquieting. They have also made it possible for us level the rich 
complexity our human connectedness with one another down to the 
world of.com. In that world the main form of our connectedness with 
one another becomes the linear simplicity of economic transactions in 
the global marketplace. It is a world in which buying and selling 
become the engine of human connectedness, price serves as the only 
measure of value and being a consumer constitutes the sum and 
substance of what it is to be human.  
Given the fact that John Paul II has been a tenacious critic of 
the dynamics of the culture of consumerism, it is a bit surprising, at 
least to me, that in Fides et Ratio he does not link that important 
element of his thought more closely to his analyses of the intellectual 
challenges facing the dialogue between faith and reason. He does 
make it clear that the central issues raised in the encyclical are 
matters of concern not just to the small circle of academically trained 
philosophers and theologians. They are, instead, matters that bear 
upon the life of every human being because the question of life’s 
meaning is inscribed in the heart of every person. Yet the encyclical 
only subjects to cursory examination what I believe is the far more 
radical challenge that is being posed to both faith and reason in the 
practical, everyday world of an emerging culture that is being driven 
by the dynamics of the so-called global market place. This culture, 
which would level all human meaning to the status of commodities to 
be auctioned off, bartered, bought or sold, is one that would have us 
put aside any larger quest for life meaning. In its place, it holds out 
before us an elusive promise that we can create for ourselves, out of 
all the commodities for sale in the global marketplace, a designer 
satisfaction for the flow of our transient preferences and desires.  
Such a promise is, in the long run, an illusory one, but, as Plato 
long ago illustrated in his tale of human being captivated by flickering 
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images on the wall of the cave, we should not underestimate our 
human capacity to take the illusory for the real. What makes the 
territory ahead of us particularly challenging is that we seem to have 
in our hands the potentiality for performing what Charles Taylor has 
chillingly called spiritual lobotomy upon ourselves (Sources of the Self, 
520). We might just be able to re-imagine ourselves, and thus try to 
reshape ourselves, as devoid of a quest for larger meaning and thus 
with neither need nor use for faith or for reason. Although Fides et 
Ratio is of some help in alerting us to this challenge, it unfortunately 
provides us only with very sketchy guidance for meeting it. For the 
new chapter of Catholic intellectual history that it opens, it writes only 
the first sentence. The daunting task of writing the rest of the chapter 
lies in our hands, and it is a task that will require not only the 
intellectual acumen of philosophers and theologians but also the 
willingness of the people of God to live in ways that bear witness to 
the reality that gives our humanity a meaning that far surpasses 
anything the market place promises: the God whose very being 
animates our spirit and whose presence is the only satisfaction of the 
deepest of our desires. 
 
